The Journal of Appellate Practice and Process
Volume 13

Issue 2

Article 4

2012

Cardozo at 100
Andrew L. Kaufman

Follow this and additional works at: https://lawrepository.ualr.edu/appellatepracticeprocess
Part of the Judges Commons, and the Legal Biography Commons

Recommended Citation
Andrew L. Kaufman, Cardozo at 100, 13 J. APP. PRAC. & PROCESS 183 (2012).
Available at: https://lawrepository.ualr.edu/appellatepracticeprocess/vol13/iss2/4

This document is brought to you for free and open access by Bowen Law Repository: Scholarship & Archives. It has
been accepted for inclusion in The Journal of Appellate Practice and Process by an authorized administrator of
Bowen Law Repository: Scholarship & Archives. For more information, please contact mmserfass@ualr.edu.

CARDOZO AT 100*
Andrew L. Kaufman**
The shelf life of judicial reputation is short. How many
judges from a hundred years ago can most lawyers recall, except
perhaps as a name? My subject, Benjamin Cardozo, is the
exception. The year 2013, when this essay went to press, marks
a hundred years since Cardozo was first elected to the New York
Supreme Court, the leading New York trial court, and seventyfive years since he died as a Justice of the United States
Supreme Court. He is one of the very few judges of that era
whose name currently means something to the legal profession
and beyond. Unlike any other contemporary, he is still
remembered for his career as a state court judge and also, albeit
somewhat less, for his career on the United States Supreme
Court. My thesis is that the public memory is somewhat askew
as to the essence of what ought to be remembered in both
venues.
First as to the memory of the Benjamin Cardozo of the
New York Court of Appeals. Cardozo is remembered as the
judge who brought the common law into the twentieth century,
the judge who adapted the general principles underlying
centuries of traditional law to the dynamic changes of an
industrializing society, the judge who realized that the atomized
societies of previous centuries were becoming more and more
interdependent and that law needed to recognize the new
economic and social reality. While a careful reading of the body
of Cardozo's work supports that conclusion, it does not portray
the whole Cardozo. There was another Cardozo, who gave more

Copyright 2013 Andrew L. Kaufman.
** Charles Stebbins Fairchild Professor of Law, Harvard Law School. I have not provided
citations to cases or footnote references to support the conclusions reached in this essay.
Citations and supporting references may be found in the relevant portions of Andrew L.
Kaufman, Cardozo (Harv. U. Press 1998).
*

THE JOURNAL OF APPELLATE PRACTICE AND PROCEss Vol. 13, No. 2 (Fall 2012)

184

THE JOURNAL OF APPELLATE PRACTICE AND PROCESS

weight to, or put more burdens on, the other organs of
government. A great many of his most famous opinions are
matched by an opinion in an analogous case in which he did not
modernize the law, did not create a new duty to reflect changes
in society. Cardozo modernized most in situations where the
way had been foreshadowed, or at least hinted at, in previous
legislative or judicial action in his own state.
On the other hand, Cardozo believed that his position as a
judge in a democratic society counseled leaving the
responsibility for law reform to the legislature when issues were
complex and the consequences of change uncertain. His
references in many opinions to possible limits on the doctrine
being enunciated were not window dressing to be ignored in
subsequent opinions. Quite often the lawyerly ingenuity that
expanded a principle enunciated a limitation to the principle as
well. Thus the seminal opinion imposing liability on auto
manufacturers to the ultimate buyer of its defective product is
matched by an opinion refusing to impose liability on a public
utility to the company whose property was destroyed by fire,
allegedly because of failure of the water company to supply
water at specific hydrants. Indeed, a series of cases in which
Cardozo invoked doctrine and policy in support of liability
based on foreseeability is matched by a series of cases in which
he invoked doctrine and policy to deny foreseeability-based
liability. One can find other series of such paired cases
throughout the various areas of doctrine that he considered
during his eighteen years on the New York Court of Appeals.
The same ambiguity can be seen in his writings, most
notably in The Nature of the Judicial Process,' a series of
lectures that continues to be reprinted and sold in substantial
numbers over ninety years after they were delivered. Cardozo
trumpeted the then-contested doctrine that judges make law.
That was what his listeners and readers heard and read. But he
also cautioned that judges were constrained by history,
precedent, and the powers and responsibilities of other branches
of government. His performance on the bench demonstrated that
the cautions carried weight with him. Cardozo's judicial
philosophy was shaped by his twenty-three years as a practicing
1. Yale U. Press 1921.
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lawyer. He was a tenacious, hard-headed practical lawyer who
relied on the facts when they were favorable and on every legal
technicality when they were not. His philosophy was a lawyer's
eclectic philosophy; he generally avoided sweeping
pronouncements that might embarrass the future. A certain
ambiguity was the result. He was not the captive of any
particular approach, and one can often find general language in
his opinions to support both sides of the argument with respect
to particular issues.
A similar approach characterized Cardozo's work during
the relatively brief period he served on the Supreme Court of the
United States. He is remembered as one of the trio of JusticesBrandeis and Stone were the other two--who forcefully
dissented as the Supreme Court invalidated so much of the
economic legislation of the New Deal. Especially relevant in
view of the resuscitation of limits on the Commerce Clause by
the Supreme Court in 2012 is the fact that even Cardozo, with
his expansive opinions on the reach of the Commerce Clause,
found a limit when he wrote that Congress had gone too far in
extending the reach of the National Labor Relations Act to
slaughterhouses in New York City, arguing that finding a
relationship in that case to interstate commerce would be to find
it almost everywhere and end our federal system. That does not
sound like the Cardozo we remember, but the Cardozo we
should remember was an accommodationist. When two
important doctrines clashed, he usually found a way to give
some recognition to one even when he generally leaned in the
direction of the other, and not just in language but also in result.
The period in which Cardozo served on the Supreme
Court marked the beginning of a new approach to civil rights,
not just with respect to the race issue but also with respect to
other provisions of the Bill of Rights. Here too one can see
Cardozo feeling his way in expanding the scope of constitutional
civil liberties. While he wrote important opinions protecting the
rights of African-Americans, both in individual criminal cases
and in cases involving group rights, and while he made an
important contribution to the constitutional protection of a free
press, he also wrote opinions containing restrictive views of the
double jeopardy and jury-trial provisions of the Constitution and
he also refused to give First Amendment protection to the

186

THE JOURNAL OF APPELLATE PRACTICE AND PROCESS

principles of conscientious objection to military service.
Cardozo was ready to open the Constitution's door to admit new
constitutional principles, but not to open it too wide.
There was one very large constitutional issue, however,
where Cardozo should be remembered for abandoning his usual
reluctance to make sweeping generalities or to stake out a major
theoretical position. Although, in the end, he withdrew a
concurring opinion from publication to accommodate Chief
Justice Hughes, who had borrowed from it, Cardozo took a stand
on what is still a major controversial issue today. Addressing the
ability, the right, of the Supreme Court to reinterpret the openended provisions of the Constitution in light of changes in
society over time, Cardozo took his text from John Marshall's
dictum that it was a constitution that the Court was interpreting,
a doctrine designed to endure for ages. He eschewed notions of
"original meaning" and literal interpretation of words. He stated
clearly and emphatically his belief that the Constitution was not
meant to be a straitjacket and should not be interpreted as such.
It was designed to be adapted to changes in economic, social,
and political conditions. Despite the fact that the opinion was
not published and exists only in Cardozo's papers, it is a
document for which he should be remembered, especially
because it reflected an uncharacteristic approach in his opinions.
He must have felt strongly about the issue to have departed from
his usual case-by-case, fact-oriented method of expression to
have been willing to take a public position on one side of a very
controversial theoretical issue. Unfortunately for history,
institutional considerations led him to withhold publication.
Finally, Cardozo is remembered for his style. His main
hobby was reading and he read widely in literature, philosophy,
and even to some extent in science. He was fascinated by
language and its ability to convey thought in striking fashion. He
employed his love of words in a constant effort, occasionally a
bit strained, to express his reasoning in memorable language.
That unique style helped make him known in his day and has
helped perpetuate his memory as law teachers use his opinions
to catch the interest of their students. I have ended many a talk I
have given about Cardozo by letting him speak for himself. I can
think of no better way to end an essay devoted to the is and the
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ought of the memory of Cardozo than by quoting some of his
more memorable words:
The criminal is to go free because the constable has
blundered.
- People v. Defore, 242 N.Y. 13, 21 (1926)
Not lightly vacated is the verdict of quiescent years.
- Coler v. Corn Exch. Bank, 250 N.Y. 136, 141
(1928)
Metaphors in law are to be narrowly watched, for starting
as devices to liberate thought, they end often by enslaving
it.
- Berkey v. Third Ave. Ry. Co., 244 N.Y. 84, 94
(1926)
The tendency of a principle to expand itself to the limit of
its logic may be counteracted by the tendency to confine
itself within the limits of its history.
- The Nature of the Judicial Process, 51 (Yale U.
Press 1921)
Danger invites rescue.
- Wagner v. Intl. R. Co., 232 N.Y. 176, 180 (1921)
The timorous may stay at home.
-Murphy v. Steeplechase Amusement Co., 250 N.Y.
479, 483 (1929)
The assault upon the citadel of privity is proceeding in
these days apace.
- Ultramares Corp. v. Touche, 255 N.Y. 170, 180
(1931)

188

THE JOURNAL OF APPELLATE PRACTICE AND PROCESS

A trustee is held to something stricter than the morals of the
market place. Not honesty alone, but the punctilio of an
honor the most sensitive, is then the standard of behavior.
- Meinhardv. Salmon, 249 N.Y. 458, 464 (1928)

One who is a martyr to a principle ... does not prove by his
martyrdom that he has kept within the law.
- Hamilton v. Regents of the U. of Cal., 293 U.S. 245,

268 (1934)
[O]f freedom of thought and speech ... . one may say that
it is the matrix, the indispensable condition, of nearly every
other form of freedom.
-Palko v. Conn., 302 U.S. 319, 326-27 (1937)
[W]e are not to close our eyes as judges to what we must
perceive as men.
-People ex rel. Alpha PortlandCement Co. v. Knapp,

230 N.Y. 48, 63 (1920)
Justice is not to be taken by storm. She is to be wooed by
slow advances.
-

The Growth of the Law 133 (Yale U. Press 1924)

[A] great principle of constitutional law is not susceptible
of comprehensive statement in an adjective.
-Carter v. CarterCoal Co., 298 U.S. 238, 327 (1936)

